Abstract. Entangled cloud storage enables a set of clients to "entangle" their files into a single clew to be stored by a (potentially malicious) cloud provider. The entanglement makes it impossible to modify or delete significant part of the clew without affecting all files encoded in the clew. A clew keeps the files in it private but still lets each client recover his own data by interacting with the cloud provider; no cooperation from other clients is needed. At the same time, the cloud provider is discouraged from altering or overwriting any significant part of the clew as this will imply that none of the clients can recover their files.
Introduction
The terminology "cloud computing" refers to a paradigm shift in which applications from a server are executed and managed through a client's web browser, with no installed client version of an application required. This new paradigm-also known as the software as a service paradigm-has generated new intriguing challenges for cryptographers. In this paper we deal with the problem of cloud storage, where clients store their files on remote servers. Outsourcing data storage provides several benefits, including improved scalability and accessibility, data replication and backup, and considerable cost saving.
Nevertheless, companies and organizations are still reluctant to outsource their storage needs. Files may contain sensitive information and cloud providers can misbehave. While encryption can help in this case, it is utterly powerless to prevent data corruption, whether intentional or caused by a malfunction. Indeed, it is reasonable to pose the following questions: How can we be certain the cloud provider is storing the entire file intact? What if files that are rarely accessed are altered? Can we detect these changes and possibly recover the original content?
Possible solutions. It turns out that the questions above have been studied extensively in the last few years. Proof-of-storage schemes allow clients to verify that their remote files are still pristine even though they do not possess any local copy of these files. Two basic approaches have emerged: Provable Data Possession (PDP), introduced by Ateniese et al. [2] , and Proof of Retrievability (PoR), independently introduced by Juels and Kaliski [25] (building on a prior work by Naor and Rothblum [34] ). They were later extended in several ways in [39, 15, 3] . In a PDP scheme, file blocks are signed by the clients via authentication tags. During an audit, the remote server is challenged and proves possession of randomly picked file blocks by returning a short proof of possession. The key point is that the response from the server is essentially constant, thanks to the homomorphic property of authentication tags that makes them compressible to fit into a short string. Any data alteration or deletion will be detected with high probability. In POR, in addition, error correction codes are included along with remote file blocks. Now, the server provides a proof that the entire file could potentially be recovered in case of hitches.
Motivation. However, proof-of-storage schemes catch a misbehaving cloud provider after the fact, when targeted files have already been altered. In addition, all users must challenge the storage server regularly to make sure their files are still intact. In this paper we consider a different approach that is based on making altering or deleting files extremely inconvenient for the cloud provider. The idea is to have the clients encode all their files into a single digital clew c, an "entangled encoding", that can be used as a representation of all files and be stored on remote and untrusted servers. The goal is to ensure that any significant change to c is likely to disrupt the content of all files. This approach of data entanglement was proposed by Aspnes et al. [1] . Roughly speaking, an entangled encoding should satisfy the following properties: (i) every client which took part to the entanglement generation process should be able to recover its original file from c; (ii) if the server alters c in any way, no clients will be able to retrieve its original file (this requirement is called all-or-nothing-integrity).
Unfortunately, in the original model of Aspnes et al. [1] , the entanglement is created by a trusted authority. In addition, files can only be retrieved through the trusted authority. Thus, schemes within their framework are not suitable for cloud computing. In this paper we focus on storage schemes where the entanglement is collectively created by all clients and files can also be retrieved without interacting with any trusted entity. We will refer to our framework as entangled storage.
In a sense, entangled storage makes all users equal and with the same rights: It is financially inconvenient for a cloud provider to alter specific files or target and exclude certain "average" customers since doing so would undermine all customers in the system, even those considered "important" and, thus, profitable. From a practical perspective, users within our framework do not have to keep constantly querying the cloud provider with proof-of-storage challenges as in PDP/POR. That said, a storage solution that synergistically combines both approaches should also be considered, particularly in the case of dynamic files.
A note on the terminology. Entanglement usually refers to a physical interaction between two particles at the quantum level. Even if separated, the particles are in a quantum superposition until a measurement is made, in which case both particles assume definitive and correlated states. Analogously, in our more modest context, two entangled files are somehow linked together: A file that is intact implies the other must also be intact. Any single change to one file, destroys the other.
Our Contributions
The main contribution of this paper is to provide theoretical foundations for data entanglement. More in detail, our contributions and techniques are outlined below.
Simulation-based security. Our definition of entangled storage uses a strong simulation-based definition, capturing all possible security concerns. In the simulation-based paradigm, security of a cryptographic protocol is defined by comparing an execution in the real world, where the scheme is deployed, with an execution in an ideal world, where all the clients give their inputs to a trusted party which then computes the output for them. 1 Roughly, the ideal functionality I ESS that we introduce captures the following security requirements (see also the discussion in Section 4): (1) Privacy of entanglement: The entanglement process does not leak information on the file f i of client P i , neither to other (possibly malicious) clients nor to the (possibly malicious) server; (2) Privacy of recovery: At the end of each recovery procedure, the confidentiality of all files is still preserved; (3) All-or-nothing integrity: A malicious server overwriting a significant part of the entanglement is not able to answer recovery queries from any of the clients.
An abstract framework to realize I ESS . As a stepping stone towards the construction of entangled storage, we introduce the notion of an entangled encoding scheme, which we believe it is of independent interest. Informally, such an encoding Encode takes as input n strings f 1 , . . . , f n (together with a certain amount of randomness r 1 , . . . , r n ) and outputs a single codeword c which "entangles" all the input strings. The encoding is efficiently decodable, i.e., there exists an efficient algorithm Decode that takes as input (c, r i , i) and outputs the file f i together with a verification value ξ. Since only r i is required to retrieve f i (we don't need r j , j = i), we refer to this as "local decodability". The verification value is a fixed function of the file and the randomness. In addition, the encoding satisfies two main security properties. First off, it is private in the sense that even if an adversary already knows a subset of the input strings and randomness used to encode them, the resulting encoding reveals no additional information about any of the other input strings other than what can be derived from the knowledge of this subset. Second, it is all-or-nothing in the sense that whenever an adversary has "large" uncertainty about c (i.e., a number of bits linear in the security parameter), he cannot design a function that will answer any decoding query correctly. See Section 3 for a precise definition. Now, given an entangled encoding scheme (Encode, Decode), we describe a general framework to realize entangled storage in the cloud, with the goal of implementing the ideal functionality I ESS . Consider n (possibly malicious) clients P 1 , . . . , P n , each holding a file f i , and a (possibly malicious) server S. During the so-called "entanglement phase", the clients interact in a multiparty computation protocol Π ETG together with the server. Each client is given a file f i and learns nothing at the end of the execution; on the other hand, the server receives as input nothing and outputs Encode(f 1 , . . . , f n ). Later on, in the so-called "recovery phase", a client P i can run a twoparty protocol Π RCV together with S. The client receives as input some trapdoor (whose length is constant and independent of the length of f i ) and outputs the file f i ; on the other hand, the server is given as input the entanglement and outputs nothing.
An instantiation based on polynomials. We then provide a concrete instantiation of the above framework relying on an entangled encoding scheme based on polynomials over a finite field F. Here, the clients encode file f i by choosing a random pair of elements (s i , x i ) ∈ F 2 and defining a point (x i , y i = f i + s i ). The entanglement of (f 1 , . . . , f n ) is now the unique polynomial c(·) of degree n − 1 interpolating all of (x i , y i ). In Section 3 we show that if the field F is large enough, this encoding has (k, negl (k)) all-or-nothing integrity for security parameter k and a proper choice of the other parameters.
We finally construct secure protocols (Π ETG , Π RCV ) for the above encoding scheme, using standard cryptographic building blocks, and we show they securely realize I ESS in the model of universal composability [10] . Protocol Π ETG can be seen as an instantiation of the well-studied problem of privacy-preserving polynomial interpolation (3PI), where clients are given as input points (x i , y i ) (one for each client) with the intent of computing a polynomial c(·) interpolating these points while keeping them private. On the other hand, protocol Π RCV allows a client holding x i to retrieve c(x i ) = y i (and nothing more) together with a proof of correctness about the recovered value. We call this a protocol for secure polynomial evaluation (SPE). These protocols are described in Section 5.1 and 5.2. Our final construction is a bit more involved than the above, since clients cannot store the entire value x i (otherwise they could just store the file f i in the first place). We refer to Section 5.3 for the details.
Efficiency Trade-off. In this work, we do not focus on performance optimization and the proposed scheme should be interpreted more as a feasibility result and the first practical implementation of an entangled storage scheme. One natural way to improve performance is to limit the number of users taking part to the entanglement and create several smaller clews. This would offer a clear tradeoff between security and efficiency.
Alternative Solutions
Entangled storage was implemented through our notion of entangled encoding but, of course, it should be considered whether it can be realized in other ways.
A first natural idea is to upload each file in encrypted form to the server. Whenever a file is retrieved, a proof of retrievability (PoR) for the entire set of (encrypted) files is also executed between the client and the server. We believe such a solution would satisfy our definition of entangled storage. However, there are two impeding drawbacks to consider. First, a PoR scheme requires a redundant encoding of the data, hence the server needs more storage than strictly necessary. Second, the local computation performed by the client in a PoR scheme typically depends on the total size of the remote data. In our scenario, this is not acceptable since it makes the work of the client depend on the total number of clients. In contrast, our entangled encoding has size exactly equal to the encoded data (when files are large enough) and the work performed by a client is independent of the number of clients.
A different idea would be to encrypt each file and then upload them to the server in a randomly permuted order, such that each client knows the position of his own file. A client may use private information retrieval (PIR) to retrieve files. This way the server remains oblivious of the relative position of any file, even after several retrievals. At first, this solution may seem good enough to deter the server from erasing files. But note that the server could correctly estimate any file positions with non-negligible probability, even with the help of malicious clients. Most importantly, this proposal based on PIR does not actually satisfy our definition. Indeed, the server may end up excluding some clients while allowing others to still retrieve their files. Entangled storage mandates that no client can retrieve data whenever a significant part of it is erased.
Other Related Work
Data entanglement also appears in the context of censorship-resistant publishing systems; see, e.g., Dagster [42] and Tangler [44] . The notion of SPE is related to oblivious polynomial evaluation (OPE), introduced by Naor and Pinkas [32, 33] and studied also in [11, 47, 19, 24] . A detailed comparison of our protocols with existing solutions is given in Section 5.
The notion of all-or-nothing integrity is inspired by the all-or-nothing transform introduced by Rivest et al. [38] , and later generalized in [14] . The standard definition of all-or-nothing transform requires that it should be hard to reconstruct a message if not all the bits of its encoding are known.
Preliminaries
Notation. Given an integer n, we denote [n] = {1, . . . , n}. If n ∈ R, we write n for the smallest integer greater than n. If x is a string, we denote its length by |x|; if X is a set, |X | represents the number of elements in X . When x is chosen randomly in X , we write x $ ← X . When A is an algorithm, we write y ← A(x) to denote a run of A on input x and output y; if A is randomized, then y is a random variable and A(x; ω) denotes a run of A on input x and random coins ω.
Throughout the paper, we denote the security parameter by k. A function negl (k) is negligible in k (or just negligible) if it decreases faster than the inverse of every polynomial in k. A machine is said to be probabilistic polynomial time (PPT) if it is randomized, and its number of steps is polynomial in the security parameter.
Let X = {X k } k∈N and Y = {Y k } k∈N be two distribution ensembles. We say X and Y are -computationally indistinguishable if for every polynomial time distinguisher A there exists a function such that |Pr( A(X) = 1) − Pr( A(Y ) = 1)| ≤ (k). If (k) is negligible, we simply say X and Y are (computationally) indistinguishable (and we write X ≈ Y ).
The statistical distance of two distributions X, Y is defined as SD(X, Y ) = a | Pr( X = a) − Pr( Y = a) |. The min-entropy of a random variable X is H ∞ (X) = − log max x Pr( X = x).
Secure computation. Let φ : ({0, 1} * ) n → ({0, 1} * ) n be a functionality, where φ i (x 1 , . . . , x n ) denotes the i-th element of φ(x 1 , . . . , x n ) for i ∈ [n]. The input-output behavior of φ is denoted (x 1 , . . . , x n ) → (y 1 , . . . , y n ). Consider a multi-party protocol Π for computing φ. Roughly, we say that Π is secure if the view of any adversary A involved in the protocol Π can be simulated by ideal adversary Z, sometimes called simulator, who interacts only with an ideal functionality I φ . More precisely, in the real world, clients P 1 , . . . , P n execute protocol Π in order to compute the functionality φ(x 1 , . . . , x n ) in the presence of an (efficient) adversary A. Whereas in the ideal world, the computation of φ is performed by an ideal functionality I φ which receives all inputs by clients P 1 , . . . , P n and returns to the clients their respective outputs φ i (x 1 , . . . , x n ). Clearly, the clients do not learn any information other than their input/output given by I φ in an execution in the ideal world.
We only allow static corruptions, that is, adversaries determine the clients to corrupt at the beginning of the protocol execution. The adversary is called passive if it follows faithfully the protocol specifications but can save intermediate computations; on the other hand an active adversary can behave arbitrarily during a protocol execution. The security of a multi-party computation protocol is usually defined with respect to an adversary structure ∆, i.e., a monotone set of subsets of the players, where the adversary may corrupt the players of one set in ∆. We call such an adversary a ∆-adversary. An adversary structure is monotone in the sense of being closed with respect to taking subsets.
Let REAL Π,A(z) (k, (x 1 , . . . , x n )) denote the joint output of adversary A (holding auxiliary input z) and clients P 1 , . . . , P n in an execution of protocol Π on inputs (x 1 , . . . , x n ) and security parameter k. Similarly, let IDEAL I φ ,Z(z) (k, (x 1 , . . . , x n )) denote the joint output of ideal-world adversary Z and clients P 1 , . . . , P n in an execution with ideal functionality I φ and inputs (x 1 , . . . , x n ) with security parameter k. Then, protocol Π securely realizes I φ if for every (efficient) active/passive adversary A, there exists an (efficient) simulator Z such that
Succinct argument systems. Let R ⊂ {0, 1} * × {0, 1} * be a polynomial-time relation with language L R = {x : ∃w s.t. (x, w) ∈ R}. A succinct argument system (P, V) for L ∈ N P is a pair of probabilistic polynomial-time machines such that the following properties are satisfied: (i) (succinctness) the total length of all messages exchanged during an execution of (P, V) is only polylogarithmic in the instance and witness sizes; (ii) (completeness) for any x ∈ L we have that (P(w), V)(x) outputs 1 with overwhelming probability; (iii) (computational soundness) for any x ∈ L and any computationally bounded prover P * we have that (P * , V)(x) = 1 only with negligible probability; (iv) (argument of knowledge) for any x ∈ L and any computationally bounded prover P * such that (P * , V)(x) outputs 1 there exists a polynomial time extractor E P * outputting a witness w that satisfies (x, w) ∈ R with overwhelming probability. See for instance [45, 5] .
Succinct interactive argument systems for N P exists in 4 rounds based on the PCP theorem, under the assumption that collision-resistant function ensembles exists [28, 45] . Succinct non-interactive argument systems, also called SNARGs, are impossible under any falsifiable cryptographic assumption [23] but are known to exists in the random-oracle model [29] or under nonfalsifiable cryptographic assumptions [5] .
Entangled Encoding Schemes
In this section, we introduce the notion of an entangled encoding scheme and show a construction based on polynomial interpolation. Intuitively, an entangled encoding scheme encodes an arbitrary number of input strings f 1 , . . . , f n into a single output string using random strings r 1 , . . . , r n (one for each input string). We assume that all input strings have the same length . The following definition captures an entangled encoding scheme formally.
Def inition 3.1 (Entangled Encoding Scheme) An entangled encoding scheme is a triplet of algorithms (Setup, Encode, Decode) defined as follows.
Setup. Setup is a probabilistic algorithm which, on input a security parameter k, the number of strings to encode n, and the length parameter , outputs public parameters (F, R, C). We call F the input space, R the randomness space and C the entanglement space.
Encoding. Encode is a deterministic algorithm which, on input strings f 1 , . . . , f n ∈ F and auxiliary inputs r 1 , . . . , r n ∈ R, outputs an encoding c ∈ C.
(Local) Decoding. Decode is a deterministic algorithm which, on input an encoding c ∈ C and input r i ∈ R together with index i, outputs string f i ∈ F and a verification value ξ. This value must be a fixed function ξ(f i , r i ) of the file and the randomness.
Correctness of decoding requires that for all security parameter k and length , public parameters (F, R, C) ← Setup(1 k , n, ), input strings f 1 , . . . , f n ∈ F and auxiliary inputs r 1 , . . . , r n ∈ R, we have (
. We let F i and R i for i = 1, . . . , n be random variables representing the choice of f i and r i , respectively. We make no assumption on the distributions of F i and R i , but note that of course the distribution of R i will be fixed by the encoding scheme. We let F −i (f −i ) denote the set of all variables (values) except F i (f i ). Similar notation is used for R i and r i . An entangled encoding scheme satisfies two main security properties.
Privacy: Even if an adversary already knows a subset of the input strings and randomness used to encode them, the resulting encoding reveals no additional information about any of the other input strings other than what can be derived by the knowledge of this subset. More precisely, let U denote some arbitrary subset of the pairs (F j , R j ) j=1...n , and let C be the encoding corresponding to all elements, i.e., C = Encode(F 1 , . . . , F n , R 1 , . . . , R n ). Let V be the set of (F i , R i ) not included in U , i.e., V = (F −U , R −U ). An entangled encoding scheme is private if, for all u ∈ U and all c ∈ C, the distribution D V |U of the random variable V when given U = u is statistically close to the distribution D V |U C of the random variable V when
All-Or-Nothing Integrity: Roughly speaking, if an adversary has a large amount of uncertainty about the encoding C = Encode(F 1 , . . . , F n , R 1 , . . . , R n ), he cannot design a function that will answer decoding queries correctly. More precisely, let U be defined as under privacy, and define a random variable C U that is obtained by applying an arbitrary (possibly probabilistic) function g(·) to U and C. Now the adversary plays the following game: he is given that C U = c for any value c and then specifies a function Decode Adv . We say that the adversary wins at position i if F i is not included in U and Decode Adv (R i , i) = Decode(C, R i , i). The encoding has (α, β) all-or-nothing integrity if H ∞ (C|C U = c ) ≥ α implies that for each i, the adversary wins at position i with probability at most β. In particular, in order to win, the adversary's function must output both the correct file and verification value.
Def inition 3.2 ((α, β) All-or-Nothing Integrity) We say that an entangled encoding scheme (Setup, Encode, Decode) has (α, β) all-or-nothing integrity if for all probabilistic polynomial time adversaries A, for all subsets U ⊂ {(F j , R j )} j=1...n , for all (possibly unbounded) functions g(·) and for all i ∈ [n] \ {j : (F j , R j ) ∈ U }, we have that
whenever H ∞ (C|C U = c ) ≥ α (where the probability is taken over the choices of the random variables F i , R i and the coin tosses of A).
Note that β in the definition of all-or-nothing integrity will typically depend on both α and the security parameter k, and we would like that β is negligible in k, if α is large enough. We cannot ask for more than this, since if α is small, the adversary can guess the correct encoding and win with large probability. We now design an encoding scheme that has the properties we are after. As a first attempt, we consider the following. We choose a finite field F, say of characteristic 2, large enough that we can represent values of F i as field elements. We then choose x 1 , . . . , x n uniformly in F and define the encoding to be c, where c is the polynomial of degree at most n − 1 such that c(x i ) = f i for all i. Decoding is simply evaluating c. Furthermore, the all-or-nothing property is at least intuitively satisfied: c has degree at most n and we may think of n as being much smaller than the size of F. Now, if an adversary has many candidates for what c might be, and wants to win the above game, he has to design a single function that agrees with many of these candidates in many input points. This seems difficult since candidates can only agree pairwise in at most n points. We give a more precise analysis later.
Privacy, however, is not quite satisfied: we are given the polynomial c and we want to know how much this tells us about c(x i ) where x i is uniformly chosen. Note that it does not matter if we are given x j for j = i, since all x j are independent. We answer this question by the following lemma: Lemma 3.3 Given a non-constant polynomial c of degree at most n, the distribution of c(R), where R is uniform in F, has min-entropy at least log |F| − log(n).
Proof. The most likely value of c(R) is the value y for which c −1 (y) is of maximal size. This is equivalent to asking for the number of roots in c(X) − y which is at most n, since c(X) − y is not 0 and has degree at most n. Hence P r(c(R) = y) ≤ n/|F|, and the lemma follows by definition of min-entropy.
It is reasonable to assume that c will not be constant, but even so, we see that the distribution of c(R) is not uniform as we would like, but only close (if n |F|). In some applications, a loss of log n bits in entropy may be acceptable, but it is also easy to fix this by simply one-time pad encrypting the actual data before they are encoded. This leads to the final definition of our encoding scheme:
Setup: Given as input the length of the n data items to be encoded and the security parameter k, define F = F = GF (2 max( ,3k+log n+log log n) ), R = F 2 and C = F n .
Encoding: Given f 1 , . . . , f n to encode, choose x i , s i ∈ F uniformly (and independently) at random, and set r i = (x i , s i ); in case x i = x j for some index i = j output a special symbol ⊥ and abort. Otherwise, define Encode(f 1 , . . . , f n , r 1 , . . . , r n ) = c to be the polynomial of degree at most n − 1 such that c(x i ) = f i + s i for i = 1, . . . , n.
It is trivial to see that Decoding outputs the correct file. The verification value is c(x i ) = f i +s i thus it is indeed a function of the file and the randomness, as required by the definition. The encoding is also easily seen to be private: In fact, by the uniformly random choice of s i , given any subset U of (F j , R j ) j=1...n the encoding C does not reveal any additional information on V = (F −U , R −U ). For all-or-nothing integrity, we have the theorem below. Its conclusion may seem a bit complicated at first, but in fact, reflects in a natural way that the adversary has two obvious strategies when playing the game from the definition: he can try to guess the correct encoding, which succeeds with probability exponentially small in α, or he can try to guess the correct field element that is computed at the end of the game (by making his function constant). However, the latter strategy succeeds with probability exponentially small in |F|. The theorem says that, up to constant factor losses in the exponent, these are the only options open to the adversary.
Theorem 3.4
The above encoding scheme has (α, max(2 −k+2 , 2 −(α−3)/2 )) all-or-nothing integrity.
Before coming to the theorem, we need the following lemma:
Lemma 3.5 Let U , C U be as in the definition of all-or-nothing integrity and suppose the pair
is not included in U . Then for the encoding scheme defined above, and for any c , we have
Proof. Suppose first that we are given values for all F j , R j where j = i and also for C and F i , i.e., we are given the polynomial c, all f j and all (x j , s j ), except (x i , s i ). Let V be a variable representing all this. Before a value of V is given, x i , s i are uniformly random and independent of the f j 's and of the (x j , s j ) where j = i. It follows that when we are given a value of V , the only new constraint this introduces is that c(x i ) = s i + f i must hold. Now, if c is constant, this gives no information at all about x i , so assume c is not constant. Then for each value s i , it must be the case that x i is in a set consisting of at most n elements, since c has degree at most n − 1. Therefore we can specify the distribution of x i induced by this as follows. The set of all x i is split into at least |F|/n subsets. Each subset is equally likely (since s i is uniform a priori), and the elements inside each subset are equally likely (since x i is uniform a priori). Each subset is, therefore, assigned probability at most n/|F|, and thus, also the largest probability we can assign to an x i value (if the subset has size 1). Therefore, the conditional min-entropy of X i is at least log |F| − log n. Now observe that the variable C U can be obtained by processing V using a (possibly randomized) function. If we assume that a value of C U is given, the conditional min-entropy of X i is at least as large as when V is given. This actually requires an argument, since it is not the case in general that the min-entropy does not decrease if we are given less information. In our case, however, if we are given U = u, the resulting distribution of X i will be a weighted average computed over the distributions of X i given values of V that map to U = u. But all these distributions have min-entropy at least log |F| − log n and hence so does any weighted average.
We now turn to the proof of Theorem 3.4.
Proof (of Theorem 3.4).
We assume that the distribution D of the polynomial c in the view of the adversary has min-entropy at least α, so that the maximal probability occurring in the distribution is at most 2 −α . The adversary now submits his function Decode Adv , and he wins if (f i , c(x i )) = Decode Adv (x i , s i ) for an arbitrary but fixed i ∈ [n]. We want to bound the adversary's advantage.
In particular, the adversary's function must output the correct value of c(x i ), so we may as well bound the probability that g(x i ) = c(x i ) for a function g chosen by the adversary, where c is chosen according to D and x i has large min-entropy as shown in Lemma 3.5 above.
Let c be the probability that g(x i ) = c(x i ) for a fixed c, then = c q c c where q c is the probability assigned to c by D. A standard argument shows that P r( c ≥ /2) ≥ /2 since otherwise the average c q c c would be smaller than .
Consider now the distribution D which is D restricted to the c's for which c ≥ /2. The maximal probability in this new distribution is clearly at most 2 −α+1 / . It follows that D assigns non-zero probability to at least 2 α−1 polynomials. We now define C be a subset of these polynomials. There are two cases: 1) if 2 α−1 ≤ 3 |F|/n, we set C to be all the 2 α−1 polynomials in question; 2) otherwise, we set C to be an arbitrary subset of 3 |F|/n polynomials. We now define a modified game, which is the same as the original, except that the polynomial c is chosen uniformly from C . By construction, we know that the adversary can win with probability /2 by submitting the function g. Now define, for c i , c j ∈ C , the set X ij = {x ∈ F | c i (x) = c j (x)}. And let X = ∪ i,j X ij . Since all polynomials in C have degree at most n − 1, it follows that |X | ≤ n|C | 2 . Note that if x ∈ X , then c(x) is different for every c ∈ C and one needs to guess c to guess c(x). We can now directly bound the probability we are interested in:
where the last inequality follows from Lemma 3.5. Since we already know that there is a way for the adversary to win with probability /2, we have /2 ≤ |C | 2 n log n |F| + 1 |C | . In case 1), this implies ≤ 2 −(α−3)/2 , in case 2) we get ≤ 2 −k+3 . The theorem follows.
Entangled Storage of Data
For reasons of clarity, we define data entanglement for clients each holding only a single file f i of length . However, all our definitions and constructions can be easily extended to cover an arbitrary number of files (of arbitrary length) for each party by either encoding multiple files into a single one or by allowing to put in as many files as desired.
Ideal Implementation of Data Entanglement
We now define an ideal implementation/functionality I ESS of an entangled storage scheme. The functionality is shown in Figure 1 . The main security requirements captured by I ESS are discussed below.
Privacy of entanglement. We argue that the ideal functionality captures privacy of the entanglement process. That is, the client's files are private to both the other clients and the server. This is represented by the fact that in the ideal execution, at the end of the entanglement process, all participants receive only a message Entangled as acknowledgement that the input files are indeed entangled.
Privacy of recovery. The inputs of clients P 1 , . . . , P n need to remain private also during the recovery process run by client P i together with S. This is satisfied in the ideal implementation because the server does not get any output when running the recovery process. Furthermore, client P i queries (Recover, P i ) to the ideal functionality. If client P i decides to cheat, the adversary simply chooses an arbitrary value f i as P i 's output, and thus P i learns nothing new. Therefore, clients cannot learn about other client's files after the entanglement and the recovery process. A malicious server can merely decide whether a party should obtain his file. This is inevitable as a corrupted server can always deny to have participated. Hence, also a collusion of clients and the server cannot infer any information about files of honest clients.
All-or-nothing integrity. The server should be unable to deny a given client (or a subset of the clients) access to the entanglement without also impairing all other clients. In other words, if the server modifies the entanglement, nobody should be able to recover its original file anymore. In the ideal implementation, the server can send a message (Overwrite) to the functionality, indicating that it wants to "forget" part of the data it was supposed to store (e.g., because S wants to sell part of its storage to other clients). Whenever this happens, a boolean value bad is set to true and, from this point on, any honest client wishing to recover its file will receive value ⊥ at the end of the recovery procedure. Of course, a corrupt server can also decide to answer incorrectly to a recovery query without necessarily overwriting its memory.
Entangled Storage Scheme
In a nutshell, an entangled storage scheme ESS = (Gen, Π ETG , Π RCV ) implements an entangled encoding scheme (cf. Definition 3.1) in the cloud setting. More precisely, ESS enables n clients, in a set P = {P 1 , . . . , P n }, to send their data in a privacy-friendly way to a server S. Assume client P i holds a file f i of length ; the server will store a piece of information c which "entangles" all files f i 's while preserving their confidentiality, and such that: (i) the server is unable to alter f i without harming all others files and (ii) every client can recover its own file f i (and nothing more).
Def inition 4.1 (Entangled Storage Scheme) Let (Setup, Encode, Decode) be an entangled encoding scheme. Consider n clients in a set P = {P 1 , . . . , P n } and a server S. An entangled storage scheme is a tuple ESS = (Gen, Π ETG , Π RCV ), defined as follows.
Parameters Generation. Upon input a security parameter k, the length parameter and the number of clients n, the PPT algorithm Gen outputs a pair (pp i , sp i ) ← Gen(1 k , n) for each client P i where pp i and sp i are the public and secret parameters of client i ∈ [n]. In addition, Gen runs the Setup algorithm of the underlying encoding scheme, yielding a description of the input space F, the randomness space R and the entanglement space C.
Entanglement. The (possibly interactive) protocol Π ETG is run by the clients and the server, and computes a functionality ((f 1 , r 1 ,
where
The functionality I ESS is parameterized by the security parameter k, entanglement size n and file space F. Initialize boolean bad as false. The interaction with an ordered set of (possibly corrupted) clients P = {P 1 , . . . , P n }, a (possibly corrupted) server S, and ideal adversary Z is enabled via the following queries:
• On input (Entangle, P i , f i ) from party P i , if f i / ∈ F, ignore the input; Else, record (P i , f i ). Ignore any subsequent queries (Entangle, P i , * ) from party P i . If there are already n recorded tuples (P j , f j ), send Entangled to all parties in P, server S, and adversary Z. Mark session as Entangled.
• On input (Overwrite) from adversary Z, set bad to true.
• On input (Recover, P i ) from P i , check if session is Entangled. If not ignore the input. Otherwise, record (Pending, P i ) and send (Recover, P i ) to S and Z.
On input (Recover, S, i) from S or Z, check if session is Entangled and record (Pending, P i ) exists. If not, ignore the input. Otherwise:
-If S and P i are both corrupted ignore the input.
-If P i is corrupted and S is honest, in case bad is true output ⊥ to P i . Otherwise, hand (Cheat, P i ) to Z. Upon receiving (Cheat,
-If S is corrupted and P i is honest, in case bad is true output ⊥ to P i . Otherwise hand (Cheat, S) to Z. Upon receiving (Cheat, S, deliver ∈ {yes, no}) from Z, if deliver = yes output f i to P i and if deliver = no output ⊥ to P i .
-If S and P i are both honest, output f i to P i .
Delete record (Pending, P i ). r i ← R and c ∈ C is an entanglement of the files f i ∈ F, i.e. c is such that c = Encode(f 1 , . . . , f n , r 1 , . . . , r n ).
Recovery. The interactive protocol Π RCV is a two-party protocol between a client P i and the server S, computing a functionality ((pp i , sp i ), c) → (f i , −).
Correctness of ESS demands that for all (pp
, for all (F, R, C) ← Setup(1 k , n, ) and all files f 1 , . . . , f n ∈ F, it holds that c ← Π ETG ((f 1 , r 1 , pp 1 , sp 1 ) , . . . , (f n , r n , pp n , sp n ), −) satisfies c = Encode(f 1 , . . . , f n , r 1 , . . . , r n ) and (
The Security Definition
The ideal functionality of Figure 1 holds the data and gives it to a client on request, if the adversary allows this (in real life an adversarial server can always refuse to play even if he has the data). To capture the AONI property, the functionality has a "overwrite flag" that the adversary can set, and once this happens, the functionality no longer hands out data to any client.
This last feature, however, introduces a technical difficulty when proving security: the simulator should know when to set the overwrite flag. This should happen when the adversary's uncertainty about the encoding becomes large enough, but this uncertainty is not necessarily easy to compute. For instance, the adversary could erase the entire encoding from the regular storage but instead store it in some strange different format that the simulator cannot necessarily make sense of. We solve this problem by giving the simulator an oracle that on input the server's view so far will output the uncertainty of the initial encoding given the adversary's current state. Note that the uncertainty can always be computed in principle by running through all possible values of the encoding to test of they are consistent with the current state. We denote such oracle by O ∞ (·); upon input a string view A ∈ {0, 1} * the oracle returns the value of H ∞ (C|state A ) where C is uniform over the entanglement space C of the encoding scheme and state A is the state of A having seen view A .
It is important to understand that this is only a technicality: a realistic adversary would want to simply erase its storage to use it for something else, and would not want to store data in other strange formats. If we restrict the adversary to such a behaviour, the oracle we give the simulator is trivial to implement: one just needs to count the number of memory cells that have been overwritten. Thus this issue is not a caveat in our construction but rather comes from the fact that the standard Turing machine model cannot quite capture the behaviour one would expect from a cheating server in the real model.
Formally, denote by IDEAL I ESS ,Z(z) (k, (f 1 , . . . , f n , −)) the output of an ideal adversary Z, server S and clients P 1 , . . . , P n in the above ideal execution of I ESS upon inputs (f 1 , . . . , f n , −) and auxiliary input z given to Z. The functionality I ESS is implemented via an entangled storage scheme ESS = (Gen, Π ETG , Π RCV ), as defined in Definition 4.1. We denote by REAL ESS,A(z) (k, (f 1 , . . . , f n , −)) the output of adversary A, server S and clients P 1 , . . . , P n in a real execution of ESS upon inputs (f 1 , . . . , f n , −) and z given to A. (f 1 , . . . , f n ) and auxiliary input z,
Def inition 4.2 (Security of
Entangled Storage) We say that ESS securely realizes I ESS , if for any PPT real adversary A there exists a PPT simulator Z, having oracle access to O ∞ (·), such that for any tuple of inputs{IDEAL I ESS ,Z(z) (k, (f 1 , . . . , f n , −))} k∈N ≈ {REAL ESS,A(z) (k, (f 1 , . . . , f n , −)} k∈N .
Construction
Our construction of ESS is based on two primitives that we use as building blocks: PrivacyPreserving Polynomial Interpolation (3PI) and Secure Polynomial Evaluation (SPE). For each primitive, we provide both an abstract definition and concrete instantiations. The schemes in this sections are analyzed in the case of standalone security. An extension to the UC-setting can be found in Appendix C.
Privacy-Preserving Polynomial Interpolation
The problem of privacy-preserving polynomial interpolation (3PI) was introduced in [16] and is defined as follows. We have n clients in a set P = {P 1 , . . . , P n } where each client P i holds a point (x i , y i ) in some finite field F. All clients want to agree on a polynomial c(X) (of minimum degree) such that y i = c(x i ), for all i = 1, . . . , n, without disclosing the actual points. We are interested here in a slightly different context where an additional party S is added to the set P, but it provides no input. Loosely speaking, an ideal implementation for 3PI realizes a functionality ((x 1 , y 1 ) , . . . , (x n , y n ), −) → (−, . . . , −, c(X)); we denote this functionality with I 3PI .
We propose several instantiations of 3PI based on linear secret sharing, homomorphic encryption or oblivious transfer. These solutions are presented in Appendix A.
Secure Polynomial Evaluation
Let F be a finite field and c(X) ∈ F[X] a polynomial stored on a remote server S. Let c = (c 1 , . . . , c n ) be the coefficients of c(·). A secure polynomial evaluation is an interactive protocol Π SPE which allows a client P i to evaluate c(X) on a chosen input x ∈ F without disclosing to S any information about x and c(X). More precisely, Π SPE is a two-party protocol which computes a functionality (x, c(·)) → ((c(x), ν(c) ), −), where ν is some arbitrary function ν : F n → {0, 1} * . I SPE denotes the ideal functionality associated to SPE.
We propose several instantiations securely realizing I SPE based on (somewhat) homomorphic encryption. We refer the reader to Appendix B for the details.
Final Protocol
We construct an entangled storage scheme using our entangled encoding scheme (Setup, Encode, Decode) based on polynomials over a finite field F = GF (2 max( ,3k+log n+log log n) ) (see Section 3); we do this by combining Π 3PI for 3PI (see Section 5.1) and Π SPE for SPE (see Section 5.2). The scheme assumes implicitly that there exists an efficient mapping to encode binary string of length as elements in a finite field F. Our scheme ESS = (Gen, Π ETG , Π RCV ) is described below.
Parameters Generation. Upon input a security parameter k ∈ N, the number of clients n and the length parameter , the Gen algorithm provides each client P i with secret parameters sp i = σ i . The secret σ i is the seed for a (publicly available) pseudo-random generator G : {0, 1} k → {0, 1} 2max( ,3k+log n+log log n) . In addition, Gen outputs the description of a collision resistant hash function H(·) and (
Entanglement. Protocol Π ETG is run between clients P i , holding a point (x i , y i ) where
, and server S (holding no input). The protocol consist of a run of protocol Π 3PI from Section 5.1. Note that c = Encode(f 1 , . . . , f n , r 1 , . . . , r n ) where
The clients need to store only the seed σ i , and a hash value θ i = H(y i ).
Recovery. Protocol Π RCV is run by client P i , holding input (σ i , θ i ), and server S, holding input c(·). To retrieve f i , client P i first computes (s i , x i ) = G(σ i ) and then runs protocol Π SPE from Section 5.2 with the server S. In the end, P i recovers c(x i ) = y i and thus
In addition S gives a proof of "correct computation" with respect to the operations involved in the SPE protocol. Consider the version of Π SPE based on somewhat homomorphic encryption. Let (P, V) be an interactive argument of knowledge for the following N P-language: 2 L SPE = {(e, e * ) : ∃(evk, c(·)) s.t. e * = Eval evk (e, c(·))} . The server S plays the role of the prover and client P i the role of the verifier. The client outputs accept iff H(y i ) = θ i and P(evk, c(·)), V)(e, e * ) = 1.
Security analysis. To argue about the security of our construction, we will rely on the security guarantees provided by the underlying building blocks.
Theorem 5.1 (Security of main construction) Assume protocol Π 3PI is secure in the presence of an active, static ∆ 3PI -adversary and that Π SPE is secure in the presence of an active adversary. Furthermore, assume that G is a secure pseudo-random generator and H is a collision resistant hash function. Then, the entangled storage scheme ESS from above is secure in the presence of a static, active ∆ * -adversary, where ∆ * = {∆ ∪ {S} | ∆ ∈ ∆ 3PI }.
Proof. Since A is static, the set of corrupted clients in ∆ 3PI is fixed once and for all; we denote this set as δ 3PI ∈ ∆ 3PI . We need to show that for any adversary A as in the theorem statement, there exists a simulator Z (with oracle access to O ∞ ) interacting with the ideal functionality I ESS , such that for all inputs f 1 , . . . , f n ∈ F and auxiliary input z,
The simulator Z, with access to A, is described below.
1. Upon input security parameter k, values {(f j , σ j )} (for all indexes j such that P j ∈ δ 3PI ), and auxiliary input z, the simulator invokes A on these inputs. Initialize and maintain a variable view A containing the entire view of A during the simulation.
2. Run the simulator Z 3PI underlying protocol Π 3PI on input {(f j , σ j )} (for all indexes j such that P j ∈ δ 3PI ). The simulator Z 3PI invokes A who controls all clients P j ∈ δ 3PI and S and will choose the values (x i , y i = f i + s i ) at random for all the honest players P i ∈ δ 3PI . Receive c = (c 0 , . . . , c n−1 ) from Z 3PI and forward the result to A. Send (Entangle, P j , f j ) to the ideal functionality I ESS ; receive back message Entangled.
3. Upon input (Recover, P i ) for client P i , invoke oracle O ∞ upon input view A . Let u be the value returned by the oracle. Then:
(a) In case u ≥ α, send (Overwrite) to I ESS .
(b) In case u < α, send (Recover, S, i) to the ideal functionality.
i. If P i is honest and S is corrupted, receive (Cheat, S) from the functionality, send back (Cheat, S, flag), where flag := no if the malicious server denies the party P i to recover its file; else, flag is set to yes. Run the simulator Z SPE underlying protocol Π SPE and play the role of the verifier in (P, V) upon input x i (for the previously chosen values (x i , y i )), with A being the prover. ii. If P i is corrupted and S is honest, receive (Cheat, P i ) from the trusted party. Run the simulator Z SPE underlying protocol Π SPE and play the role of the prover in (P, V), with A being the verifier. Let x i be the value that Z SPE forwards to its own ideal functionality; send (Cheat, P i , c(x i ) − s i ) to I ESS .
Output whatever A does.
We consider a series of intermediate hybrid experiments to show that the ideal output and the real output are computationally close. A description of the hybrids follow.
Hybrid H 1 (k, (f 1 , . . . , f n , −)). We replace Z by Z 1 which runs protocol Π 3PI in step 2 instead of invoking Z 3PI . Clearly, security of Π 3PI implies
Hybrid H 2 (k, (f 1 , . . . , f n , −)). We replace Z 1 by Z 2 which knows the real inputs f i of the honest clients and uses these values while running Π 3PI . From the privacy property of the entangled encoding scheme, we get that H 1 (k, (f 1 , . . . , f n , −)) and H 2 (k, (f 1 , . . . , f n , −)) are statistically close.
Hybrid H 3 (k, (f 1 , . . . , f n , −)). We replace Z 2 by Z 3 which on step 3a does not send (Overwrite) to I ESS , but instead answers recovery queries from P i as in step 3b.
Notice that in H 2 , once the flag bad is set, the ideal functionality would answer all such queries with ⊥. Let Bad 1 be the following event: Bad 1 becomes true whenever a client P i accepts the output of a recovery query as valid and the oracle O ∞ returned u ≥ α on that query. Denote with H 3 (k, (f 1 , . . . , f n , −)) the distribution of H 3 conditioned on Bad 1 not happening. Clearly H 2 (k, (f 1 , . . . , f n , −)) and H 3 (k, (f 1 , . . . , f n , −)) are identically distributed; hence it suffices to show that the probability of Bad 1 is negligible.
Claim 5.2 The probability of Bad 1 is exponentially small in k.
Proof (of claim).
We rely here on the fact that, when F = GF (2 max( ,3k+log n+log log n) ), our entangled encoding scheme of Section 3 has (α, β) all-or-nothing integrity for β = max(2 −k+2 , 2 −(α−3)/2 ). In particular, any (computationally bounded) adversarial strategy provoking event Bad 1 with probability ≥ β starting from a polynomial where at least α bits have been overwritten, can be used to break the all-or-nothing integrity property of the encoding scheme.
In the reduction, an adversary attacking the all-or-nothing integrity property of (Setup, Encode, Decode) would simply simulate the environment for A and choose the function g(·) in such a way that g(c(·)) = c (·), so that he will win if c (x i ) = c(x i ). Here c (·) is the polynomial contained in the view of A when event Bad 1 happens. Now, since oracle O ∞ (·) returned a value u ≥ α, the min-entropy left in the entanglement given view A is at least α bits. Thus, by Theorem 3.4, we can conclude that Pr( Bad 1 ) is exponentially small in k for a proper choice of α.
There is a small caveat, though. The proof of the all-or-nothing integrity property crucially relies on the fact that the function g(·) is chosen independently of x i . In the above reduction, instead, the adversary sees an encryption of x i so that it is not immediately clear if the argument goes through. However, we will argue that if the choice of the function g(·) could depend on x i , then one could violate semantic security of the encryption scheme underlying protocol Π SPE .
To prove the latter claim, we rely on the extractor E P * of the argument of knowledge P.
Consider an adversary B attacking semantic security of (Gen, Enc, Dec, Eval): Given the public key, B chooses some message x i , receives a ciphertext e and has to decide whether this corresponds to an encryption of x i or it is an encryption of a random message. At this point, B can simulate the environment for A by replacing the encryption of x i with the challenge ciphertext e. Given an accepting answer as output, B runs the extractor E P * to obtain a witness (evk * , c * (·)). Hence, if Eval evk * (e, c * (·)) = c (x i ) the adversary can conclude that e must be an encryption of x i (i.e., output "real") and otherwise the challenge ciphertext must be completely independent of x i (i.e., output "random"). We see B breaks semantic security, and thus the choice of g(·) must be independent of x i as desired.
Hybrid H 4 (k, (f 1 , . . . , f n , −)). We replace Z 3 by Z 4 which answers recovery queries differently in case S is corrupted. Namely, on step 3b Z 4 does not send (Cheat, S, flag) to I ESS , but instead computes the answer to a recovery query from P i as f i = c (x i ) − s i where c (·) is the polynomial that Z SPE sends to its own ideal functionality. The only difference between H 3 and H 4 is that in H 3 the ideal functionality would always answer to such queries with the correct value f i .
Let Bad 2 be the event that P i accepts the output of a recovery query in H 4 and f i = f i ; furthermore denote with H 4 (k, (f 1 , . . . , f n , −)) the distribution of H 4 conditioned on Bad 2 not happening. Clearly, H 3 (k, (f 1 , . . . , f n , −)) and H 4 (k, (f 1 , . . . , f n , −)) are identically distributed. Moreover it is easy to verify that the probability of Bad 2 is negligible, otherwise one could break either collision resistance of H(·) or the soundness property of (P, V). The reduction is straightforward and is therefore omitted.
Hybrid H 5 (k, (f 1 , . . . , f n , −)). We replace Z 4 by Z 5 which chooses the points (x i , y i ) of the honest players as in the real protocol, i.e. it defines y i = f i +s i for G(σ i ) = (s i , x i ). We claim that any probabilistic polynomial-time machine distinguishing between the two hybrids can be turned into a probabilistic polynomial-time distinguisher breaking pseudo-randomness of G(·).
The distinguisher is given access to an oracle returning strings v ∈ {0, 1} 2max( ,3k+log n+log log n) with the promise that they are either uniformly distributed or computed through G(·). Hence, the distinguisher interprets v i as an element in F 2 , parses v i as v i = (s i , x i ) and uses these values together with files f i to define the input of Π 3PI . Now, when the v i 's are uniform, the distribution is the same as in hybrid H 4 (k, (f 1 , . . . , f n , −)), whereas when v i = G(σ i ) the distribution is the same as in hybrid H 5 (k, (f 1 , . . . , f n , −)). Thus, given a distinguisher between the two hybrids we can break the pseudo-randomness of G(·).
Hybrid H 6 (k, (f 1 , . . . , f n , −)). We replace Z 5 by Z 6 which executes protocol Π SPE as it would be done in a real execution, i.e. it does not rely on the simulator Z SPE . Indistinguishability of H 5 (k, (f 1 , . . . , f n , −)) and H 6 (k, (f 1 , . . . , f n , −)) immediately follows from the security of Π SPE .
It is easy to see that the output distribution of the last hybrid experiment is identical to the distribution resulting from a real execution of the protocol. We have thus showed that IDEAL I ESS ,Z(z) (k, (f 1 , . . . , f n , −)) and REAL ESS,A(z) (k, (f 1 , . . . , f n , −) are computationally close. This concludes the proof.
[47] H. Zhu and F. Bao. Augmented oblivious polynomial evaluation protocol and its applications. In ESORICS, pages 222-230, 2005.
A Possible Solutions to 3PI

A.1 Solutions via Linear Secret Sharing or Homomorphic Encryption
A natural approach to the problem of privacy-preserving polynomial interpolation, is to interpret the inputs of each client as one equation in a system of n equations in n unknowns, the unknowns being the coefficient of the polynomial c(X). In fact, c(X) interpolates all (x i , y i ) if and only if
where A is a Vandermonde matrix. We briefly review already known solutions for the above problem. Such solutions can be based on any instantiation of the following two primitives: -Threshold additively homomorphic encryption (e.g., Paillier's cryptosystem [35, 18] ). Such a scheme has the following properties: (i) To share a value a party can encrypt it using the public key of the cryptosystem and broadcast the ciphertext; (ii) An encrypted value can be opened using threshold decryption; (iii) Given ciphertexts Enc pk (µ 1 ), Enc pk (µ 2 ) and plaintext µ 3 , parties can compute Enc pk (µ 1 + µ 2 ) and Enc pk (µ 3 · µ 1 ) non-interactively; (iv) Given ciphertexts Enc pk (µ 1 ) and Enc pk (µ 2 ), parties can compute Enc pk (µ 1 · µ 2 ) in a constant number of rounds.
-Linear secret sharing (eg., [40, 20] In what follows we say that a value is shared if it is distributed according to one of the above two methods; similarly a matrix or a polynomial are shared if all the elements of the matrix or the coefficients of the polynomial are shared. A solution to 3PI can be obtained using the method of [4] 
The type of security we achieve depends on the particular sharing scheme we employ. In case of passive adversaries, the protocols above are secure for adversary structure ∆ 3PI = Q 2 (i.e., no two sets in ∆ 3PI cover the entire set of clients). In case of active adversaries, we can tolerate ∆ 3PI = Q 3 by using verifiable secret sharing and zero-knowledge proofs (or Q 2 assuming a broadcast channel).
A.2 A Solution based on OT
A different approach to 3PI can be based on a solution to a related problem, called privacy preserving cooperative linear system of equation (PPC-LSE). Every client P i holds a matrix A i ∈ F n×n and a vector b i ∈ F n . The clients execute a protocol to privately compute a solution c ∈ F n such that
, where, at the end of the protocol, each client learns c[i], i.e. a single element of c. Notice that a solution to this problem implies a multi-party protocol Π 3PI for 3PI, where each client P i holds
and the vector c contains the coefficients of the polynomial c(X). Indeed, the sum of A i results in a Vandermonde matrix. A solution to this problem exists in [16, 46] but only for the 2-party scenario (in the semihonest model). Next, we extend this solution to the multi-party case, assuming one of the players is not willing to collude. Before describing the protocol, we sketch how to handle non-colluding parties in secure computation.
Secure computations.
In the standard definition of secure computation the adversary A is considered as monolithic. This automatically models collusion between clients and gives strong security guarantees. For some protocols one may be able to prove security in a more restricted setting where some of the parties are not willing to collude. This needs to be defined explicitly; here we adopt the formalism of [26] .
Instead of considering a single adversary which gets to see the state and all the messages exchanged by the corrupted clients, we consider a set of non-monolithic adversaries, each corrupting at most one (non-colluding) party and having access only to the view of that party. A different (monolithic) adversary controls the set of colluding clients. Security is defined by requiring that indistinguishability between the real and ideal world distributions hold with respect to the honest clients' outputs and a single adversary's view. In other words, for each independent adversary A i , the joint distribution composed of the honest clients' outputs and A i 's view in the real world-denoted REAL k, (x 1 , . . . , x n ))-should be indistinguishable from the joint distribution composed of the honest clients' outputs and the simulator Z i 's output in the ideal world-denoted IDEAL (i)
. . , x n )). We refer the reader to [26, Definition 4.1] for the details.
Protocol description. The following two sub-protocols Π 1 and Π 2 will serve as building blocks for the final construction.
-The first sub-protocol Π 1 allows client P 1 , called initiator, to privately retrieve A := P(A 1 + . . . + A n )Q where P, Q are randomly chosen matrices.
-The second sub-protocol Π 2 allows the initiator P 1 to obtain privately b :
The initiator P 1 solves the linear equation A · c = b and sends c to client P 2 (called the assembler). P 2 derives c = Q · c as the final solution to the equation (A 1 + . . . + A n ) · c = (b 1 +. . .+b n ). Recall that privacy and security hold with respect to semi-honest clients P 1 , . . . , P n . In all (sub)protocols, we merely assume client P 1 does not collude to ensure privacy of clients's inputs. The collusion of any (subset of) client(s) excluding P 1 does not harm the privacy.
First sub-protocol. Π 1 is described in Figure 2 . We prove that protocol Π 1 privately computes I LSE 1 in the semi-honest model. The ideal functionality I LSE 1 receives as input A i of client P i and outputs to client P 1 the value P(A 1 + . . . + A n )Q, where P, Q $ ← F n×n . All other clients P 2 , . . . , P n receive the empty string.
Theorem A.1 (Privacy of protocol Π 1 ) Assuming the clients P 1 , . . . , P n are semi-honest, and P 1 does not collude, the protocol Π 1 enables P 1 , . . . , P n to privately compute functionality I LSE 1 .
Proof. Since client P 1 is non-colluding, we need to consider a non-monolithic adversary A = (A 1 , A 2 ) as described in Section 2. At the beginning of the execution, A 1 is given the index corresponding to the non-colluding (corrupted) client P 1 , whereas A 2 is given the indexes corresponding to the (corrupted) colluding clients. We denote the latter set with J and we let H be the set of (indexes corresponding to) honest clients; as we only consider static adversaries these sets are fixed once the protocol starts. Moreover, since P 1 and P 2 have a special role in the protocol, we will assume (without loss of generality) that these clients are always corrupted; the case when P 1 and P 2 are honest can be easily derived as a special case.
Steps performed by clients P 1 , . . . , P n . Each P i holds A i ∈ F n×n . Parameters p, m are chosen such that log(p)m = O(k).
1. Clients P 1 and P 2 decompose A 1 (resp. A 2 ) by sampling random matrices X
2. For each j = 1, . . . , m, client P 1 and P 2 perform the following sub-steps:
(a) P 1 sends (H 1 , . . . , H p ) to client P 2 where H l = X
j for a secretly chosen index l ∈ [p] and H i (with i = l) sampled uniformly.
(b) P 2 chooses random matrices P, Q and computes P(H i +X (2) j )Q+R j for each i = 1, . . . , p, where R j is a random matrix.
(c) P 1 executes 1-out-of-p OT and learns
3. Client P 2 sends to clients P i (with i = 3, . . . , n) the matrices P and Q, and m j=1 R j to P 1 .
4. Clients P i with i = 3, . . . , n send PA i Q to client P 1 .
5. Client P 1 , after receiving all values, computes: In order to prove privacy, we build simulator Z = (Z 1 , Z 2 ) whose output in a joint execution with clients P 1 , . . . , P n interacting with ideal functionality I LSE 1 is computationally indistinguishable from a real execution with an adversary A. In particular, for each independent adversary A i , we need to show that the joint distribution composed of the honest clients' outputs and A i 's view in the real world is indistinguishable from the joint distribution composed of the honest clients' outputs and the simulator Z i 's output in the ideal world.
We introduce the following notation. The view of client P i during an execution of Π on (x 1 , . . . , x n ), denoted by VIEW
, where x i is P i 's input, ω i is P i 's internal coin tosses, and µ i j is the j-th received message by client P i . The output of client P i is denoted by REAL Π i (x 1 , . . . , x n ) which is included by definition in its view. As for the non-colluding client, REAL
In the ideal world, let REAL
be the output returned to {P i } i∈H by the trusted party. Then, IDEAL
(1)
In a similar fashion, as for the colluding clients, REAL
Description of Simulator. We start with the description of Z 1 .
• Upon input (A 1 , A) , Z 1 samples uniformly matrices P and Q which will simulate the matrices P, Q.
• Afterwards, Z 1 samples uniformly A i ∈ R F n×n for i = 3, . . . , n and computes P A i Q which simulates the matrices PA i Q sent by client P i . In our case, the matrices A i have a special structure (they are sparse and only one row is non-zero). In this case, Z 1 picks randomly x i ∈ R F (for i = 3, . . . , n) and generates matrices A i according to the special structure.
• Z 1 finds A 2 (to simulate A 2 ) by solving
• Z 1 generates m random matrices Y
m .
• Z 1 generates random matrices X (1) j for j = 1, . . . , m using the same coin tosses ω that P 1 uses in generating these matrices.
• Z 1 generates random matrices R j for j = 1, . . . , m.
We define Z 1 (A 1 , A) as
Next, we describe simulator Z 2 for simulating {VIEW
The simulator takes as input A j for j ∈ J. Note that protocol Π 1 provides no output to client P j (j ∈ J). Thus, Z 2 simply generates m · p uniformly chosen matrices (H 1,1 , . . . , H 1,p ) , . . . , (H m,1 , . . . , H m,p ), uses the randomness ω to sample X (2) 1 , . . . , X (2) m and defines the view of client P 2 as {A 2 , ω, X
For the view of the remaining clients in J, the simulator Z 2 , upon input {A j } j∈J of clients P j , samples uniformly matrices P and Q which will simulate the matrices P, Q. Therefore, we define the view of P j as {A j , ω, (P , Q )} for j ∈ J and j = 2.
Analysis. Protocol Π 1 privately computes P(A 1 + . . . + A n )Q if the following statements hold: k, (x 1 , . . . , x n )).
Statement (1).
Recall that the view of client P 1 in the protocol is defined by
Since P , Q are sampled uniformly from all matrices of size n×n, the simulation of matrices P, Q is statistically close. The same argument holds for matrices Y (2) 1 , . . . , Y (2) m simulating X (2) 1 , . . . , X (2) m perfectly. All matrices A i are built according to the predefined structure and thus, are sampled from the same distribution as A i . Hence, both random variables Z 1 (A 1 , A) and VIEW
Statement (2). The view of client P 2 in the protocol is
However, since matrices H 's are randomly chosen, we cannot conclude immediately that Z 2 simulates VIEW Π 1 2 (A 1 , . . . , A n ) correctly. In fact, the matrices H's in the real protocol are not all random, but satisfy the following property: There exists a vector l = (l 1 , . . . , l m ) (with 1
However, it is not possible to identify such a vector with probability better than 1/p m which is negligible since log(p)m = O(k). We can thus conclude that the output produced by Z 2 is computationally indistinguishable from the view of party P 2 .
Similarly, the view of P j (for j > 2 and j ∈ J) is defined by VIEW
. . , A n ) = {A j , ω, (P, Q)} which is indistinguishable from the output {A j , ω, (P , Q )} computed by Z 2 because P , Q are sampled uniformly from all matrices of size n × n as matrices P, Q are. Thus, (2) holds, as well.
Second sub-protocol. Π 2 is quite similar to Π 1 and is described in Figure 3 . Basically, protocol Π 2 privately computes I LSE 2 in the semi-honest model, where ideal functionality I LSE 2 , upon input b i of client P i , outputs to client P 1 the value b := P(b 1 + . . . + b n ), with P $ ← F n×n . All other clients P 2 , . . . , P n receive the empty string.
Theorem A.2 (Privacy of protocol Π 2 ) Assuming the clients P 1 , . . . , P n are semi-honest, and P 1 does not collude, the protocol Π 2 enables P 1 , . . . , P n to privately compute functionality I LSE 2 .
The proof goes along the lines of the proof of Theorem A.1 and is therefore omitted.
The final protocol. Given both sub-protocols Π 1 and Π 2 , we build protocol Π 3PI for 3PI as follows.
1. For i ∈ [n], client P i computes A i and b i as
Protocol Π 2 Steps performed by clients P 1 , . . . , P n . Each P i holds a vector b i ∈ F n . Parameters p, m are chosen such that log(p)m = O(k).
1. Clients P 1 and P 2 decompose b 1 (resp. b 2 ) by sampling random vectors x
2. For each j = 1, . . . , m client P 1 and P 2 perform the following sub-steps:
(a) P 1 sends (h 1 , . . . , h p ) to client P 2 where h l = x (1) j for a secretly chosen index l ∈ [p] and h i (with i = l) sampled uniformly.
(b) P 2 chooses random matrices P and computes P(h i + x (2) j ) + r j for each i = 1, . . . , p, where r j is a random vector.
(c) P 1 executes 1-out-of-p OT and learns P(h l + x
3. Client P 2 sends to clients P i (with i = 3, . . . , n) the matrix P, and m j=1 r j to P 1 .
4. Clients P i with i = 3, . . . , n send Pb i to client P 1 .
5. Client P 1 , after receiving all values, computes: 2. Clients P 1 , . . . , P n execute protocol Π 1 such that only P 1 privately computes A = P(A 1 + . . . + A n )Q. Clients P 2 , . . . , P n have no knowledge about A.
3. Clients P 1 , . . . , P n execute protocol Π 2 such that only P 1 privately computes b = P(b 1 + . . . + b n ). Clients P 2 , . . . , P n have no knowledge about b. Here, P 2 chooses the same matrix P as in the previous step.
4. P 1 solves the linear equation A · c = b. If a solution c exists, hands it over to client P 2 . Otherwise, the protocol is aborted.
5. P 2 computes c = Q · c and broadcast vector c to all clients P 1 , P 3 , . . . , P n .
The vector c contains the coefficients of the sought-after polynomial c(·).
Theorem A.3 (Privacy of protocol Π 3PI ) Assuming clients P 1 , . . . , P n are semi-honest, and P 1 does not collude, the protocol Π 3PI enables P 1 , . . . , P n to privately compute functionality I 3PI , i.e., it allows clients P i with input (x i , y i ) ∈ F to privately compute polynomial c(·) such that c(x i ) = y i for all i ∈ [n].
We need to provide simulators Z 1 , Z 2 whose output is computationally indistinguishable from the view of clients P 1 and P 2 , . . . , P n in a real execution of protocol Π 3PI . This is straightforward through the simulators of the sub-protocols Π 1 and Π 2 . Hence, we omit the formal proof here.
Clients Download Sending Additions Multiplications Efficiency. When estimating computational and communication costs, we must take into consideration that some clients assume specific roles (e.g., P 1 as initiator and P 2 as assembler). Table 1 provides an overview for sub-protocol Π 1 . Protocol Π 2 has similar complexity with the exception that computations are performed on vectors of size n rather than on matrices of size n 2 . Regardless, all operations are performed in the finite field F. Note also that clients P 1 and P 2 execute two instances of 1-out-of-p OT [9] . Choosing p = 2 and m = O(k), where k denotes the security parameter, allows to instantiate our protocol with the usage of the well-investigated 1-out-of-2 OT [37] . Efficient constructions for OT can be found, for instance, in [13, 36, 17] . Note that our construction's security holds against semi-honest adversaries. For this reason we merely need an OT scheme secure against such adversaries.
Client P 1 solves also one linear equation, and P 2 executes one multiplication before the solution vector is broadcasted to every client. The overall complexity for P 1 is O(n + k), and O(k) for P 2 while being constant for clients P 3 , . . . , P n . Thus, we have O(n 3 + n 2 k) in terms of computational complexity since operations are performed on either matrices of size n 2 or vectors of size n. Efficiency can be improved by exploiting the fact that matrices A i 's are sparse. We do not elaborate on this further.
We compare the efficiency of our protocol with previous solutions for PPC-LSE. Given the two-party protocols of [16, 46] , one can obtain a scheme for the case of n parties by running the underlying two-party solution n 2 times; this approach results in a high communication complexity due to the high number of OT executions. A related work [27] addresses PPC-LSE in the multiparty setting in the so-called "commodity-server model". Here, parties derive the solutions to a PPC-LSE instance with the help of a (possibly untrusted) commodity-server. The solution of [27] has a lower communication complexity of O(t · n), where 1 ≤ t ≤ n − 1 is a bound on the number of parties allowed to collude. (We stress that, in any case, the commodity-server is never allowed to collude so that there must be at least 2 non-colluding parties.)
In contrast, our scheme yields communication complexity O(n+k) and needs to assume a single non-colluding party. Moreover, due to the asymmetric structure of our construction, resourceslimited clients may be in favor of playing the roles of P 3 , . . . , P n .
B Possible Solutions to SPE
A related notion to SPE is oblivious polynomial evaluation (OPE). The difference is that, in OPE, the client does not learn anything about c(X), apart from the value c(x) (i.e., ν(c) is the empty string).
Clearly any protocol for OPE would work also for SPE. The most efficient instantiation of OPE (due to Hazay and Lindell [24] ) is based on Paillier's encryption and runs in a constant number of rounds; the computational complexity consists of 1297n + 4160 exponentiations (where n is the degree of the polynomial held by the server) and the communication complexity is O(s · n · |N |), where s is a security parameter (that should be set to 160) and N is the RSA modulus.
Since SPE is easier than OPE, we expect to devise more efficient solutions. We sketch some options below:
-Naïve approach. The trivial solution is to simply "leak" the entire polynomial c(·) to the client. This solution requires the transmission of n field elements and the client to evaluate a polynomial over a large field.
-Homomorphic encryption. If we use an additive homomorphic encryption scheme, e.g. Paillier [35] , then the client could send the powers {x i } n−1 i=1 encrypted and the server could evaluate c(x) in encrypted form (under P i 's public key). Communication complexity is similar as in the naïve approach but now P i does not have to compute c(x).
-Somewhat homomorphic encryption. The most effective approach is to rely on a (somewhat) homomorphic encryption scheme (Gen, Enc, Dec, Eval) that is able to perform up to n multiplications and an arbitrarily large number of additions. Here, client P i sends the point x encrypted and the server simply evaluates c(x) in encrypted form (under P i 's public key) using the Eval procedure. The complete protocol is shown in Figure 4 .
We have the following theorem.
Theorem B.1 Assume the somewhat homomorphic encryption scheme (Gen, Enc, Dec, Eval) is CPAsecure. Then, the protocol Π SPE of Figure 4 securely realizes I SPE in the presence of a static, active adversary.
Before proceeding to the proof, we recall the syntax and security definitions for fully-homomorphic encryption (FHE), pioneered by Gentry [21] and studied intensively in the last few years [22, 31, 43, 41, 8, 12, 7, 6] . Informally, FHE is an additively and multiplicatively homomorphic encryption scheme that makes it possible to add and multiply encrypted messages without resorting to decryption.
A homomorphic (public key) encryption scheme is a collection of the following algorithms HE = (Gen, Enc, Dec, Eval), defined below.
Key Generation. Upon input a security parameter 1 k , algorithm Gen outputs a secret and public key (sk , pk ) and an evaluation key evk.
Encryption. Upon input a public key pk and a message µ, algorithm Enc outputs a ciphertext e.
Decryption. Upon input a secret key sk and a ciphertext e, algorithm Dec outputs a message µ.
We now show, via a hybrid argument, that for any c(·) ∈ F[X] and any x ∈ F, and for any auxiliary input z
In the first hybrid experiment, we remove the trusted party and let Z 1 interact directly with P i . Essentially Z 1 is identical to Z, but it receives the correct input x from P i . Hence, Z 1 extractsĉ as Z would do and usesĉ(x) as output of the trusted party. Then Z 1 outputs Z's output together withĉ(x). Note that this experiment is distributed exactly as an execution in the ideal world, because Z 1 just plays all the roles by itself. Thus,
In the second hybrid experiment, we replace Z 1 with Z 2 which computes the ciphertext e using the value x ∈ F it receives from P i rather than a random x . We now show that any distinguisher able to tell apart the two experiments can be turned into an adversary B that breaks the semantic security of the encryption scheme. The adversary B receives as input a pair (pk , evk) and chooses messages µ 0 = x and µ 1 = x ; let e b denote the encryption corresponding to µ b . From this point on, B acts exactly like Z 2 , but it forwards e b instead of computing the ciphertext e. Clearly, if e b is an encryption of x, the output generated by B is distributed exactly as in H 2 A(z) ; on the other hand, if e b is an encryption of x , the output generated by B is distributed exactly as in H 1 A(z) . Since the encryption scheme is semantically secure, we must conclude that the two experiments are computationally close.
In the third experiment, we define a simulator Z 3 that is identical to Z 2 , but computes the output of P i as P i would do in a real execution of the protocol. Hence, instead of computingĉ(x) (provided that e * = Eval evk (c(·), e )), it decrypts e * (obtaining d * = Dec sk (e * )) and outputs d * .
To conclude the proof, it suffices to observe that the output distribution produced by Z 3 is identical to the one in a real execution of Π SPE . Hence, REAL and IDEAL must be computationally close.
It is easy to show that Π SPE hides the polynomial and its input even to a man-in-the-middle adversary since only encrypted values are transmitted. We omit a formal treatment of this case.
Remark B.4 (On Z) In the above proof the simulator is asked to check whether a given pair of ciphertexts (e , e * ) satisfies Eval evk (c(·), e ) = e * . In order to do so, Z needs first to compute e i = Enc pk (c i · x i−1 ) (for all i = 1, . . . , n) and finally evaluate i e i = Enc pk (c(x)). However, this strategy will work only provided that the result of the homomorphic computation is deterministic, in the sense that it should be possible, for any constant c i ∈ F, to compute ciphertext Enc pk (c i · x i−1 ) from Enc pk (x) without encrypting c i . (This is the case for instance in Paillier's scheme.) When such a property is not satisfied, the randomness used to encrypt the coefficients needs to be published as a common reference string.
Efficiency improvements & trade-offs. The efficiency of the protocol of Figure 4 , in reality, depends on the SHE scheme that is employed. For instance, if we consider the schemes in [7, 6] , we observe that the ciphertext e * will be larger as we increase the number of multiplications allowed.
Thus, given the current state of efficiency of SHE schemes, the protocol of Figure 4 is less efficient than the solution based on Paillier [35] . (Indeed, with [35] , the server would return always an element of Z * N 2 , independently of the number of homomorphic operations performed.) The following simple observation about the homomorphic encryption approach allows us to reduce the communication complexity, while keeping the same computational complexity for P i . Let n = (n 1 , . . . , n ) 2 be the binary representation of the exponent n, for = log 2 n , so that n = i=0 2 i n i . It is easy to verify that it is sufficient for the client to transmit {Enc pk (x 2 i )} i=0 to allow S to compute (homomorphically) {Enc pk (x j )} n j=1 and thus Enc pk (c(x)). This reduces the communication from O(n) to O(log n).
If we allow the client to work a bit more, we can reduce communication further. In Appendix B.1 we present a method to encode a polynomial c(X), which allows the client to evaluate Enc pk (c(x)) by uploading/downloading only √ n ciphertexts. When combined with the previous trick, this drops the communication complexity from O(n) down to O(log √ n). Yet another trade-off is possible if we assume that P i and S share a factorization of the polynomial c(X), say c(X) = j γ j (X) for polynomials γ j (·) of degree δ j such that j δ j = n−1. 5 In this case, the client works more since it has to: (i) compute and send the ciphertexts {Enc pk (x i )} δ i=1 , for δ = max(δ j ); (ii) download {Enc pk (γ j (x))} j ; (iii) decrypt and multiply the resulting plaintexts.
B.1 Communication-Efficient Encoding of Polynomials
Let c(X) = c n−1 X n−1 + . . . + c 1 X + c 0 be a polynomial of degree n − 1 with coefficients c 0 , . . . , c n−1 from a field F. For simplicity, assume there exists an element m ∈ N such that m 2 = n − 1 (i.e., m = √ n − 1). Then, the algorithm described in Figure 5 , upon input coefficients c 0 , . . . , c n−1 , outputs polynomials ζ 0 (·), . . . , ζ m (·) each of maximum degree m such that c(X) = ζ m (X) · X m·m + ζ m−1 (X) · X m(m−1) + . . . + ζ 1 (X) · X m + ζ 0 (X). Now, by adding all (sub)terms we have c(X) = m i=0 ζ i (X)X im . Thus, correctness is provided. Back to our construction from Section 5, after handing the clew c (which is a polynomial of degree n−1) over to the server, the server encodes c as described above to enhance the recovery process. Whenever a client ask for its file, say mapped by pre-image x, the server simply evaluates all polynomials ζ m , . . . , ζ 0 given the ciphertext of all powers of the input up to degree m = √ n − 1 . Note that it is not necessary to apply multiplications over encrypted values, so that any additive homomorphic encryptions scheme will work. All encrypted evaluated polynomials are then transmitted to the client who decrypts m ciphertexts and evaluates c(x) accordingly, given the values ζ 0 (x), . . . , ζ m (x).
C Extension to the UC-Model
The protocols presented in the previous sections are analyzed in the standalone setting where only sequential composition is allowed. In the context of universally composable (UC) security, protocols are analyzed in a more general setting where sub-protocols are run concurrently with other secure and insecure protocols. The composition theorem of [10] ensures that a protocol which is UC maintains its security properties even in such a general scenario.
We briefly explain how to analyze our constructions in the UC-model. The definition of universal composability is formalized by considering an additional adversarial entity called the environment E. This environment generates the inputs to all parties, reads all outputs, and in addition interacts with the adversary in an arbitrary way throughout the computation. A protocol Π securely computes an ideal functionality I in this framework if, for any adversary A that interacts with the parties running the protocol, there exists an ideal adversary Z that interacts with the trusted party, so that no environment E can distinguish the case that it is interacting with A and the parties running Π, or with Z in the ideal world with a trusted party. In this case, we say that Π UC-realizes I. We remark that secure two-party computation of most interesting functionalities in this model requires an additional trusted setup assumption such as a common reference string.
We can easily extend Theorem 5.1 to prove that our main construction from Section 5 UCrealizes I ESS in the presence of active, static adversaries. In the proof, the communication with the environment can be handled as follows: Every input value that Z receives from E is written on A's input tape (as if coming from A's environment). Similarly, every output value written by A on its output tape is copied to Z's own output tape (to be read by Z's environment E). Apart from this, the same analysis as in the current proof will work, because all the interactions between Z and Z 3PI and Z SPE are straight-line (i.e., Z does not use rewinding). One exception is the rewinding extractor E P * which is invoked in the proof of Claim 5.2. However, the extractor is called only internally during the reduction to semantic security and is not directly invoked by the simulator Z; so, this rewinding procedure does not affect the proof in the UC-model. Note also that in protocol Π SPE we use a PKI to validate P i 's public key (see Section 5.2). In case we do not do this, P i needs to transmit the value pk and prove in zero-knowledge it knows the corresponding secret key sk .
Then, Z SPE needs to use rewinding in order to extract the secret key and maintain the simulation. In such a case, to prove UC-security, we would need a UC zero-knowledge argument of knowledge for the key generation procedure in question.
